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Commentary: Unpublication and the Judicial
Concept of Audience
Joan M. Shaughnessy*
Recent years have seen an increased focus on the decisionmaking practices
of the federal courts of appeals. Attention was focused on the phenomenon of
nonprecedential appellate opinions by Judge Arnold's opinion for the panel in
Anastasoffv. UnitedStates' holding that a court rule could not constitutionally
strip an unpublished court decision of all precedential value and by Judge
2
Kozinski's opinion for the panel in Hart v. Massanari, which rejected
Anastasoff and upheld the constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit's ban on the
citation of, and refusal to give precedential effect to, unpublished dispositions
of that circuit. 3 Rulemakers have also turned their attention to the issue; a
proposed rule on the citation of unpublished opinions, Proposed Federal Rule4
for several years.
of Appellate Procedure 32.1, has been under consideration
Many observers, among them several of the scholars contributing to this
symposium, have pointed to a range of problems and concerns raised by the
widespread practice of unpublication generally and no-citation rules in
particular. 5 As Professor Schiltz notes in his contribution to the symposium,
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lexington,
Virginia; B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton; J.D., University of Chicago. I am
indebted to David S. Caudill for organizing this symposium and inviting me to provide
comments and to the Frances Lewis Law Center and the Washington and Lee Law Review for
sponsoring the symposium. I benefited enormously from the contributions of all the symposium
participants, particularly Patrick J. Schiltz, Stephen R. Barnett, and Penelope J. Pether, to whose
papers I responded, and from helpful comments offered by Brian Murchison. Thanks are also
due to Erica Richards for her editorial assistance.
1. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc, 235 F.3d
1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
2. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
3. See Penelope Pether, Take a Letter, Your Honor: Outing theJudicialEpistemologyof
Hart v. Massanari, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1553 (2005) [hereinafter Take a Letter] (analyzing
Anastasoffv. United States and Hartv. Massanari).
4. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explainingthe Sturm Und Drang over
the Citation of UnpublishedOpinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005), for a complete
history of the rulemaking activity to date.
5. See Schiltz, supranote 4, at 1432 n. 11 (citing articles that describe nonpublication);
William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1723,
1723 n.3 (2005) (same).
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some commentators have argued that the current system threatens the values of
fairness and openness that are central to our procedural system.6 Professor
Pether, in her Stanford Law Review article and her contribution here, has
presented evidence that the current system particularly disadvantages members
of vulnerable groups.7 Professor Barnett testified in favor of the proposal to
permit citation of unpublished opinions, 8 and his recent empirical work
suggests that lawyers who have experienced rules permitting citation support
such rules and find they work well. 9
I share many of the concerns raised by our panelists and others about the
current system and will not revisit them. Instead, I will reflect briefly on how
revealing the debate over nonpublication has been. It has given rise to some
very frank and often surprising descriptions of the work of the federal appellate
courts today. I will not attempt a full description here, but I will point to a few
nuggets that seem to me to be particularly revealing.
Professor Schiltz's summary of comments in opposition to the changes to
Rule 32.1 includes the following description: "Because unpublished opinions
are hurriedly drafted by staff and clerks, and because they receive little
attention from judges, they often contain statements of law that are imprecise or
inaccurate."' 0 One of the members of the Advisory Committee for the
Appellate Rules opposed Rule 32.1 on the grounds that unpublished opinions
are "junk law."" As other symposium participants have noted, Judge Alex
Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has

6. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 1467-69 (remarking that some attorneys feel that nocitation rules amount to a "gag order" that shields these opinions from accountability and public
scrutiny and that thwarts "equal justice").
7. See Penelope Pether, InequitableInjunctions: The ScandalofPrivateJudging in the
US. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435, 1504-14 (2004) [hereinafter Inequitable Injunctions]
(criticizing the institution of unpublished opinions as masking the process which favors some
groups and disadvantages other groups); Pether, Take a Letter, supra note 3, at 1591 (same).
8. See Hearingon ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules ofAppellate Procedure
Before the AppellateRules Committee, UnitedStates JudicialConference, 108th Cong. 17-18
(2004) (statement of Stephen R. Barnett) (advising that the Committee should "recommend
adoption ofproposed Rule 32.1 "), availableat http://www.nonpublication. com/barnett32. 1.pdf.
9. Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog that Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, Judicial
Conference Rulemaking, andFederalPublicDefenders, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1491, 1504
(2005) (finding "virtually no complaints" in allowing citation to unpublished opinions).
10. Memorandum from Patrick J. Schiltz, Reporter, to the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Schiltz Memo], available at
http://www.nonpublication.com/schiltz.pdf.
11. Minutes of Spring 2004 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 8,
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes/appO4O4.pdf. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at
1449 n.99, 1452 n.126 (identifying Mr. Sanford Svetcov as the speaker).
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opinions to "sausage" that is "not safe for human
likened some unpublished
2
consumption. "
Contrast these statements to Judge Kozinski's description of the process of
writing a published opinion. In an interview with Jeffrey Cole published last
summer in Litigation, the judge reported that his opinions go through fifty or
the care with
more drafts, sometimes many more.13 He repeatedly stressed
14
which each phrase of a published opinion is scrutinized.
The extreme disparity found in these descriptions is striking. Of course,
these descriptions do represent extremes, and perhaps some rhetorical excess as
well. (As Professor Barnett's empirical work suggests, many lawyers find the
quality of most unpublished opinions to be good. 15) Nevertheless, they do
suggest that judges believe they are engaged in two very different tasks-one6
task represented by published opinions, one by unpublished dispositions.
Moreover, at least some judges believe that those separate tasks carry with them
very different obligations.' 7 One might describe the differences by saying that
the judges seem to believe they are writing for very different audiences.
The audiences for unpublished dispositions are described as solely the
litigants, their attorneys, and the lower court whose judgment has been
12. See Judge Kozinski, Public Comment 03-AP-169, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 (Jan. 16, 2004) (writing in opposition to proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1), availableat http://www.nonpublication.com/kozinskiletter.pdf.
13. See Jeffrey Cole, My Afternoon with Alex: An Interview with Judge Kozinski, LrrtG.,
Summer 2004, at 16 (discussing Judge Kozinski's desire that his opinions be both read and
enjoyed).
14. UnpublishedJudicialOpinions: HearingBefore the House Subcomm. on Courts,the
Internet,and IntellectualPropertyof the Comm. on the Judiciary,107th Cong. 12-13 (2002)
(stating opinion of Hon. Alex Kozinski et al.).
15. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 1551-52 (arguing for adoption of Rule 32.1).
16. See Richman, supra note 5, at 1725 (describing a "two-track" system of appellate
justice).
17. A striking example of this phenomenon is found in the report of the June 2004
deliberations of the Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, in which one of the
members, commenting on Proposed Rule 32.1, is reported as observing:
One of the members suggested that the key issue was not citation, but the status of
unpublished opinions. He pointed out that the committee note refers to
unpublished opinions as "official actions" of the court. But, he noted, they are
commonly crafted by law clerks and only endorsed byjudges. They do not receive
the same scrutiny as published opinions and clearly do not represent the views of
the full court. The proposed rule, he said, would elevate unpublishedopinions into
actions of the court and give them a status that they do not presently have.
Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 9, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june2004.pdf (emphasis added). I should note
that this comment may not have been made by a judicial member of the Committee.
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appealed. Their interest is seen as limited to knowing the resolution of their
dispute and some rough description of the basic reason why the case was won
or lost.18 It is as though no other audience for these dispositions exists in the
judges' minds-not their colleagues on the appellate bench (it seems to me that
a certain "we all know that we don't write these things" attitude crops up fairly
often in the comments' 9) and not members of the bar or the public. The idea
seems to be that, although these dispositions are often available to the public
and the bar, there is no reason for that audience to be interested in what they
say.2 ° The dispositions are not written for the public; they are rather, as
Professor Pether has noted, akin to a private letter to the parties from the
21
court.

The audience for published opinions is clearly different. Unsurprisingly,
references are made in the literature to other members of the panel, to other
judges of the court, and to district court judges within the circuit-to all those,
in other words, who will be bound by the decision.22 It is understood as well
18. See, e.g., Schiltz Memo, supranote 10, at 39 (noting that unpublished opinions are
"written for those already familiar with the case"); Judge Browning, Public Comment 03-AP076, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Dec. 30, 2003) ("[An unpublished
disposition] contains minimal factual and legal analysis, and is intended to give the parties a
general understanding of the panel's reasons for its decision"), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-076.pdf; Judge Fernandez, Public
Comment 03-AP-061, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Dec. 22, 2003)
("Unpublished dispositions are, essentially, designed to dispose of a single case to speak to the
parties. ... It is one thing to write a decision for the purpose of speaking only to the individuals
then before the court; it is quite another thing to write a decision intended to speak to other
individuals also."), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/Comments/03-AP061 .pdf; Letter from Judge John L. Coffey et al., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
to Judge Alito, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, Judicial Conf. of the U.S. 1 (Feb.
11, 2004) ("The purpose of [unpublished orders] is to give the parties an explanation of the
reason for the decision."), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP396.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that unpublished opinions "appear to
have been written (but most likely were not) by three circuit judges"); Schiltz Memo, supra note
10, at 39 (stating that "unpublished opinions are hurriedly drafted by staff and clerks"); Prof.
Eugene Volokh, Public Comment 03-AP-158, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
32.1 (Jan. 21, 2004) (noting that unpublished opinions may be "drafted in haste and with little
editing by a staff attorney"), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/comments/03AP-158.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Judge Wallace, Public Comment 03-AP-082, Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, at 2 (Dec. 23, 2003) (arguing that there is no "precedential value" in
unpublished opinions, and that they are used for "error correction" only), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/ pdf filescomments/03-AP-082.pdf.
21. Pether, Inequitable Injunctions,supra note 7, at 1436 n.4 (citing Hart v. Massanari,
266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001)).
22. See, e.g., Judge Nelson, Public Comment 03-AP-131, Proposed Federal Rule of
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that members of the bar who practice before the courts of the circuit are also
immediate audiences for the published decision.23 It is striking to me how
demanding those audiences are seen to be in some of what I have read. It
seems that every possible nuance of the published opinion must be explored,
every conceivable reading anticipated and addressed, every future application
of the opinion foreseen.24 This immense burden is, I think, a relatively recent
imposition, perhaps a judicial self-imposition, and Judge Kozinski summarized
its history in his Hartopinion.25 (Professor Peter Tiersma's recent paper, The
Textualization of Precedent,beautifully describes this process.26 ) The courts,
in separating their law-making function from their dispute-resolving function,2 7
have seen themselves as forced to act more as legislators, attempting to hand
down a comprehensive rule to control a wide range of future decisions. 28
Appellate Procedure (Jan. 7, 2004) (describing published opinions as means of informing
lawyers and judges removed from the case), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/
Comments/03-AP- 131 .pdf; Judge O'Scannlain, Public Comment 03-AP-285, Proposed Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 5, 2004) (describing the current burden of reading
published opinions); Wallace, supranote 20 (noting that precedential opinions "guide lawyers
and judges when similar cases arise"), available at http:///secretjustice.org/pdf files/
Comments/03-AP-285.pdf.
23. UnpublishedJudicialOpinions, supra note 14, at 10.
24. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he rule [in a
precedential opinion] must be phrased with precision and with due regard to how it will be
applied in future cases. A judge drafting a precedential opinion must not only consider the facts
of the immediate case, but must also envision the countless permutations of facts that might
arise in the universe of future cases.").
25. Id.at 1159-75 (describing the transformation from common law-era case precedent to
modem-day binding authority).
26. See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization ofPrecedent,LOYOLA LA LEGAL STUDIES
PAPER No. 2005-6, at 52 (Mar. 2005) (describing the shift from a "case-law" regime,
characterized by "analysis of the facts, the issue, and the outcome," to an "opinion-law" system,
characterized by "careful scrutiny of the written words of the opinion"), available at
http://ssm.uom/abstract=680901; see alsoRichard B. Capelli, The Common Law's CaseAgainst
Non-PrecedentialOpinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.755, 784 (2003) (describing a shift away from
judicial opinions as sources of common law towards judicial opinions as statutory substitutes).
27. Interestingly, in his comment letter opposing Rule 32.1, Judge Wallace attributes the
genesis of the Ninth Circuit no-citation rule to a study by Judge Hufstedler in which she
distinguished between the error correction and precedent setting responsibility of the courts of
appeals and, according to Judge Wallace, "demonstrate[d] ...that you can have one without the
other." Wallace, supra note 20, at 2. Former Judge Hufstedler submitted a comment letter, but
did not mention this history. Former Judge Hufstedler, Public Comment 03-AP-106, Proposed
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Dec. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP- 106.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Judge Berzon, Public Comment 03-AP-134, Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Jan. 13, 2004) (opposing Rule 32.1), available at http://
www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP- 134.pdf. In the letter, Judge Berzon refers
to the "statute-like reliance on particular language" that characterizes the approach to binding
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For some judges, the perceived audience for published opinions goes well
beyond those I have described. In his OvercomingLaw, Judge Posner suggests
that "extraordinary" judges may perform their judicial duties in such a way as to
maximize their influence on the law.29 At least for those judges, intended
audiences include judges in other circuits and academics, who will notice and
perhaps be persuaded by novel, well-written, cutting-edge opinions. Professor
Schiltz's observation about judges' concern for their legacy captures this sense
of the wider
legal and academic world as the audience for many published
3
opinions. 0
What, if any, conclusions might one draw from these observations about
the issues that concern the symposium authors? First, the judges who conceive
of unpublished dispositions as private letters misunderstand their audience. As
Professor Bamett's interviews make clear, lawyers read and use unpublished
dispositions as official statements ofjudges. 31 The public, in the form of clients
in other cases, does as well.32 Professor Pether's research shows how important

precedent in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 3. See also Danny S. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks,
Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 22-23 (2000)
(describing Kozinski-Reinhardt's defense of unpublished opinions as based on a view ofjudges'
work as like legislators' in that judges are seen as "hav[ing] the power to define the law
prospectively through the use of particular authoritative language" (citing Judge Kozinski &
Judge Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished
Opinions, CAL. LAWYER, June 2000, at 43)).
29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 140-43 (1993) (describing a
mathematical model of judicial utility); see also Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial
Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1097-98, 1103-04 (2004) (describing the ethical challenges
created by judges' interest in writing important, noteworthy opinions).
30. Schiltz, supra note 4, at 1486; see also Emily Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL Arr.,
Feb. 2004, at 32 (quoting Judge Kozinski as writing that "once in a while, I write an opinion
precisely for the purpose of getting into [a casebook]").

31.

Barnett, supra note 9. See also Tim

REAGAN ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

75-121 (June 1,
2005) (reporting results of a lawyer survey on unpublished opinions), available at
http://www.fjc.gov; Lauren Robel, The PracticeofPrecedent: Anastasoff, NoncitationRules,
and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REv. 399, 406-07
(2002) (suggesting that citation prohibitions do not, in practice, allow lawyers to ignore
comfortably unpublished opinions).
32. See Laurence J. Fox, Those UnpublishedOpinions: An AppropriateExpedienceor an
Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1215, 1216 (2004) (emphasizing the
lawyer's ultimate goal-superior representation of his client); see also Minutes of the June 1718, 2004 Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 9 (reporting that "[o]ne
lawyer-member suggested that local non-citation rules pose a serious perception problem for the
courts of appeals. He said that it is difficult to explain to a client that a court has decided a
similar case in the recent past, but the case cannot be cited to the same court."), availableat
http://uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june2004.pdf.
CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
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some of those official statements can be to litigants in similar cases.3 3 The
judges whose names appear on the unpublished dispositions, whether they like
it or not, are seen by the bar and the public as responsible for what is saidin
their names 34 as well as what is done in their names. Insistence on non-citation,
as these panelists and others have shown, is perceived as an abdication of that
responsibility. 3 All court decisions should be available to the public and
should be citable to the court which rendered them.
On the other hand, the pressure of audience for published opinions may be
greater in many cases than it needs to be. Professor Schiltz's observation about
36
the overwhelming docket of the federal appellate courts is clearly correct.
The concern with resolving every future permutation of any opinion before it
has been completed may have gone too far. Ifjudges were able to re-imagine
their audience as a common law audience, expecting each opinion to contribute
only an incremental part of the body of law applicable to a problem, they might
find themselves able to write simpler, less ambitious opinions.3 7 In some cases,
at least, this would be a great advantage. 38 In others, it might be a serious loss.
The legal system benefits from brilliant, path-breaking opinions. It also
benefits from authoritative opinions setting forth generally applicable legal
rules.39 One approach, explicitly followed by some circuits and suggested by
several scholars, would be to permit judges to decide whether their decisions
should be immune from correction by a later panel, as is now the case with all
published opinions, or not.4° In other words, permit judges to designate
33. Pether, Inequitable Injunctions,supra note 7, at 1504-14.
34. Schiltz, supra note 4.
35. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account andan Opportunity
for Virtue, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1637 (2005) (arguing that uncitable opinions erode our
general confidence in the judiciary).
36. Schiltz, supra note 4, at 1475.
37. Judge Alito's description for this Symposium of the published work of his court in the
1960s is illuminating in this regard. He found the typical opinion of that era much shorter and
less complex than those published by the Third Circuit today. Much of the difference may be
due to the greater legal and factual complexity of the current docket, but it may also be, in part,
the result of a less ambitious view of precedent.
38. See Boggs & Brooks, supra note 28, at 25-26 (advocating a "one case at a time"
approach to judicial efforts); see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues
and Casual Vices in the FederalCourts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685, 721-23 (2001)
(describing some of the reasons that might counsel against subjecting a decision to the law-ofthe-circuit rule, or "self-binding precedent" to use the authors' term).
39. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1455, 1466-71 (1995)
(describing the utility of opinions written in rule-like form).
40. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's FederalAppendix:
The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 1, 21-25 (2002)
(suggesting three possible degrees of precedential weight to be afforded unpublished opinions);
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opinions as not subject to the law-of-the-circuit rule, rather than as unpublished
and not citable. Such opinions would be available as persuasive authority but
could be rejected for good reason.
this solution does not resolve the concern raised by Professor Pether and
others with differential treatment for some cases and litigants.4' Some cases
will still receive sustained attention from appellate judges and will result in
opinions that bind the circuit; many others will receive more summary
treatment. In the long run, though, that difference seems to me inevitable 42
and,
given the limited resources of the appellate courts, perhaps even helpful.
It makes sense to me that this choice-whether or not to bind the circuitshould be left to the panel. It is they who now undertake the process of
circulating opinions to all circuit judges for comment and critique, a demanding
undertaking as described by judicial commentators on Rule 32.1,43 and it is
they who are in the best position to know whether factors such as unusual facts
or unskilled advocacy counsel against binding future panels. 44 This suggestion
also responds to one of the judicial concerns mentioned by Professor Schiltz in
his symposium submission-the fear that opinions not written for publication
will bind the entire circuit if they become citable.45
This leads me to a tentative suggestion. Paradoxically, the proposed Rule
32.1 might be more acceptable to opponents if it were less modest and
explicitly addressed the law-of-the-circuit rule.46 It appears that, even without
Boggs & Brooks, supra note 28, at 24 (distinguishing between opinions that are intended to
bind the circuit and those that are not); Cooper & Berman, supra note 38, at 739-40 (same).
41. See, e.g., Pether, Take a Letter, supra note 3, at 1555 (referring to "marginalized"
groups); Richman, supra note 5, at 1730 n.27 (discussing the attitude of at least some judges
concerning the "bottom 80% of the docket").
42. See Schiltz, supranote 4, at 1475 (describing the rising caseloads in federal appellate
courts); Cooper & Berman, supra note 38, at 738-43 (describing the utility of appellate court
practice which treats some, but not all, opinions as binding the circuit).
43. See Schiltz Memo, supra note 10, at 39 (emphasizing the time committed to published
opinions); Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 28, at 44 (same).
44. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 12 (explaining the variety of situations that can
conspire to create an opinion poorly suited to be precedential); Judge Shadur, Public Comment
03-AP-066, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Dec. 18, 2003) (citing an
instance where special circumstances made a precedential opinion undesirable), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/comments/03-AP-066.pdf.
45. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 1483-84 (describing a potential reason for judicial
reluctance to endorse proposed Rule 32.1).
46. What I am suggesting is much like the earlier "alternative A" version of Rule 32.1,
which was one of three versions presented to the Advisory Committee on the Appellate Rules at
its November meeting. Schiltz, supra note 4, at 1448. That alternative, which was suggested in
part to allay fears about increasing the precedential effect ofunpublished opinions, would have
explicitly stated: "A court of appeals may designate an opinion as nonprecedential." Minutes of
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such a change, proposed Rule 32.1 is moving forward.47 The Judicial
Conference approved the Rule at its meeting on September 20, 2005.48 If
enacted, it should go some way toward alleviating the concerns expressed by
many of the participants at this symposium.

Fall 2002 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 32.1, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app1102.pdf. The version was rejected because the
Advisory Committee did not want to take a position on the issue raised in Anastasoff about
whether issuing opinions not deemed precedential is constitutional. Schiltz, supranote 4. My
suggestion may be slightly different and less problematic in that it would simply allow courts of
appeal to continue their practice of exempting "unpublished" opinions from the law of the
circuit rule. Neither Anastasoffnor any other source has ever suggested that the circuit-binding
status of published court of appeals opinions is constitutionally required. See Polly J. Price,
Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REv. 81, 86-118 (2000)

(demonstrating that Anastasoff does not subscribe to any one theory of precedent). A rule
addressing the precedential effect of unpublished opinions might also have raised Rules
Enabling Act concerns. Schiltz, supranote 4, at 1484. Those issues are interesting and difficult
in their own right, but beyond the scope of this brief commentary.
47. Schiltz, supranote 4, at 1456-57.
48. See THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULEMAKING (reporting Judicial Conference
action of Sept. 2005), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/#judicial0905.

